Venezuela - Still choosing between Chaos or Dictatorship
Maduro’s removal changed everything and changed nothing.
Once upon a time, there was a group of Venezuelan opposition and their supporters abroad who believed that swift regime change was necessary. They argued that anyone engaging in discussions with the Chavistas or suggesting negotiations or a power sharing agreement during a transition was a collaborator. And that was the worst thing anyone could be. After all, the Chavistas always use negotiations to stall for time and consolidate their own power. Only fools would negotiate with them.
Then, the US military removed Nicolas Maduro from power, but left the rest of the Chavista power structure intact. And many of those people who insisted they would never support a negotiated transition that would delay the Chavistas’ exit from office found themselves surprisingly supporting a Trump-backed three-part plan to reach a hypothetical democratic transition at some uncertain point in the future while Delcy Rodriguez remains president for now.
Some of those who spent years warning against any collaboration with the Chavistas have now flip-flopped, arguing that everyone must follow Trump’s plan to collaborate with Delcy, because otherwise there will be chaos.
Less than two months ago, when Nicolas Maduro was still in charge, I wrote that the two most likely scenarios in Venezuela were “chaos” or “consolidated dictatorship,” and that those two scenarios were far more likely than sudden democracy or negotiated transition. That newsletter included the following paragraph, making the case for a bit of chaos:
While it’s not publicly discussed much, many Venezuelan friends have pointed out to me in private that even if it’s not a smooth and peaceful transition back to democracy, chaos may be preferable to the current situation of a consolidated and criminal dictatorship. They understand that democratic transitions don’t happen easily, but are eager to roll the dice for whatever comes next, believing it will create an eventual path to a better outcome than the current situation, which will stagnate. The current situation, with political violence, prisoners, corruption, and dictatorship, is awful enough that taking a chance at any change to get unstuck is tempting.
Today, Maduro is out, but nearly all of that December post still holds true, especially the paragraph above. Maduro’s removal changed everything and changed nothing. It demonstrated a US administration willing to use military coercion to achieve its preferred outcome. But it left a dictatorship in place, unwilling to risk the chaos that might be necessary to change the regime.
The Trump administration has a three-part plan for Venezuela that looks like this:
1) Stabilization - 2) Recovery - 3) Transition
The most important part about those three vague words is their order. The Trump administration prioritized stabilization and economic recovery because they believed that pushing for a swift ousting of the current Chavista power structure would lead to chaos. They’re correct that it would! Also, focusing on recovery allows Trump to focus on oil, which was a driving factor in his decision.
One big problem right now for Venezuela’s democratic forces is that Delcy has a three-part plan that looks like this:
1) Stabilization - 2) Recovery - 3) Consolidated Dictatorship
That looks an awful lot like the Trump-Rubio plan. It’s structural indistinguishability until stage three.
Stabilization and economic recovery are exactly what the regime needs to keep going. The mirror images of the first two stages of those plans mean Venezuela doesn’t get to find out whose plan they are following until stage three. In practice, there is no neutral way to ‘wait and see’ which plan wins.
The collaboration between Trump and Delcy has created a bind for Venezuela’s democratic forces. To work with Trump right now means they are helping Delcy implement the first two stages of her plan (because Delcy’s and Trump’s first two stages are the same!). But to break from Trump and demand swifter change risks being locked out of the process by the US.
One recent pushback to my criticisms about the Venezuela transition process has been, “It’s only been three weeks….”
Sure, but it’s been a long f’n three weeks. Three weeks in which the Trump administration threatened to invade Greenland, forced our NATO allies to move military forces toward the Arctic, backed down from its Greenland threat, executed two US citizens on the streets of Minneapolis, moved an aircraft carrier to the Middle East to potentially strike Iran, and now may face another government shutdown, even as the Supreme Court appears likely to rule against the constitutionality of the IEEPA-justified tariffs.
It’s not as if those three weeks were abnormally busy. This is the pace of news right now. It will continue. Good luck keeping US attention on Venezuela and a potential transition amid all that. Next week, we’ll hear, “It’s only been four weeks.” Then, “It’s only been x months….” How long does Venezuela have to wait for a transition? There is no timeline. And there should be concern that without a timeline, consolidation of the status quo or some other wild card event may become more likely.
Every week that passes in which the Trump administration is distracted by other events at home and abroad has Delcy attempting to stabilize, change up the inner circle, and begin economic recovery with the help of the oil trade that the Trump administration is now facilitating.
Notice I said, “attempting to stabilize.” Delcy’s hold on power remains uncertain.
The interim president removed two dozen second tier military commanders, most of whom were recently promoted by Maduro, and installed people she trusts more.
She got rid of Alex Saab, a Maduro loyalist and someone who is an economic competitor to some of the corrupt actors close to Delcy.
The NYT covered how Delcy is trying to build a Venezuelan economic recovery, even as she keeps the regime’s repressive apparatus in place.
The Chavistas are trickling out prisoner releases just a few people at a time to keep up the narrative rather than just releasing all the unjustly held political prisoners at once, even as dozens of new political prisoners have been taken captive in January.
There are groups of Chavista loyalists questioning whether the president is too close to Trump (some call her DelCIA for her collaboration with the CIA), forcing the Rodriguez siblings to release audio assuring their base that they are not working with the US and that Maduro’s capture was under duress, even as Delcy plans a trip to the US and is cooperating fully with Trump.
Diosdado’s role is unclear. Is he working with the US or against it? Working with Delcy or plotting to toss her? Can Delcy box Diosdado out by firing key allies of his including those within Sebin, and does she want to?
Caracas Chronicles last Friday had a good rundown of the state of politics right now within the country and how the rivalry among all the various Chavista forces is playing out.
Meanwhile, one reason the first two stages of the Trump-Delcy plans may fail is the uncertainty about the third step. Francisco Monaldi argues in Americas Quarterly that oil companies will not invest in Venezuela’s recovery if the process lacks democratic legitimacy. Bloomberg covered the “legal minefield” that investors in Venezuela face while the status of the regime remains unclear. Uncertainty means neither of the three-step plans may make it to step two.
Over the past weekend, we saw at least three conflicting views of the Venezuelan opposition.
In an interview with Spain’s ABC, Maria Corina Machado slammed Delcy’s corruption and abuses of power, even as she praised Trump and refused to say anything negative about his strategy of working with the Chavistas.
Trump advisor Roger Stone called Machado a socialist who is fully aligned with Delcy and said the only real opponent to Chavismo is Eduardo Bittar. Sure, Stone is corrupt and crazy and completely wrong, but he remains influential enough in Trump-world that this sort of fracture within the opposition cannot be ignored.
In an interview with BBC, Henrique Capriles defends working within the institutions controlled by Chavismo, even as he warns against letting DC be the main driver of events. Capriles believes the US has an agenda that is not fully aligned with the Venezuelan democratic opposition. He stresses the importance of negotiation with the Chavistas leading to free elections and democratic guarantees.
That’s one person promising to collaborate with Trump but not Delcy. One person collaborating with Delcy but not Trump. And a third crazy and disruptive wild card that is aligned with Trump but not necessarily anyone else. It’s a coordination problem, along with the usual opposition infighting and competition. Add in Diosdado and others, and it’s a Venn Diagram with few overlaps. Here is another way to visualize it:
That diagram assumes Delcy is at the center and stable. But if she is removed, the other pieces fall out and conflict with each other. That Trump-Machado overlap is not an easy spot to reach in the fallout.
Right now, the leading two poles of the opposition (Machado and Capriles) are both in the collaboration camp in favor of a negotiated transition to democracy - one working with Trump/Rubio, the other working with Delcy. However, as the weeks go on, Venezuela’s opposition will be increasingly challenged by the collaborate-chaos divide. Nobody will call it that (except me), but two things will drive the opposition to demand Delcy's immediate removal.
It will be increasingly unpalatable for some factions of the opposition to work with Delcy on what appears to be her plot to retain power. Even if Machado wants to work within the Trump and Rubio framework, there will be political incentives for various opposition actors to break from her and resume the old position of “regime change now!” calling for a swift return to democracy.
Trump is unpopular in the US and abroad, and there is a reflexive desire to oppose his plans. When Maduro was in charge and Trump was calling for quick regime change, many anti-Trump actors in the US and Europe demanded a slower process. But now that Trump is the one calling for a slow, negotiated transition, expect his opponents to take the side of demanding an immediate end to the dictatorship and its human rights abuses. Even if that sudden conversion is just opportunistic politics, it’ll change the debate.
The slower, negotiated process avoids chaos, but avoiding chaos allows Delcy to consolidate power. Facing the choice between dictatorship and chaos, Venezuelans who want change will be increasingly eager to roll the dice. That’s why I still believe that some version of chaos is a very likely outcome in the months to come.
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Thanks for reading!
I agree with a lot of what you say. But saying that Trump has a plan is way too generous. He has the concept of a plan.
This is too fluid a situation but the only ones with a long term plan about Venezuela are Maria Corina Machado and Marco Rubio.
They have they’ve been developing it for several years and there is way more overlap there than in your diagram.
But I agree, chaos might be necessary and we should expect it and prepare for it. And Venezuelans are very clear on this. Last Meganalisis poll is impressive.
Thank you for the nuanced analysis.
One possible difference from the Maduro era is the apparent expansion of space for political participation. On January 23rd, small student-led protests took place across the country, and families of political prisoners have become far more visible in the media—something that was rare before, when many were silenced by threats and intimidation.
As for the additional political prisoners reported in January, Foro Penal has suggested that almost all but three were previously unreported cases, withheld out of fear of retaliation.
Bottom line: at least for now, there seems to be greater room for civic participation and somewhat less repression. That could change—but it may also present an opportunity. What do you think?