US Policy in LatAm - 19 May 2025

The intel debate over TdA

I write about US policy in Latin America every Monday. In today’s newsletter:

1. The debate over TdA within the intel community (no paywall on this story)

2. US policy splitting the Sinaloa cartel

3. Visa restrictions against Mexican politicians

4. The US punishes Colombia’s BRI push

5. LatAm lobbying in the US

6. Odds and ends

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A hot issue in Washington is the question of the intelligence assessments on whether the Maduro regime directs Tren de Aragua. An assessment in late February found that Maduro did not direct TdA to migrate to the US or conduct criminal/terrorist actions within the country. “While Venezuela's permissive environment enables TDA to operate, the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”

That assessment undermines a key justification for Trump’s use of the Alien Enemies Act. After a Trump-appointed official complained about the intelligence report, the National Intelligence Council again reviewed the evidence and published a new report confirming their original assessment. The only agency that disagrees with the assessment is the FBI, which largely bases its claim on interviews with TdA members arrested within the United States. The April document was declassified and published in early May.

One thing within the assessment that I strongly agree with is how it describes the loose and decentralized nature of the TdA brand. There is a gang formed almost 20 years ago with a central leadership that directs certain criminal elements. That central group, though relatively small compared to the total number of gang members calling themselves TdA, is quite dangerous and has at times worked with elements of the Maduro regime. But there are also many branches of TdA that have only weak ties with the leadership and barely communicate with them or share resources. Additionally, some expat Venezuelan gangs around the hemisphere use the TdA brand without ever having been part of the main organization.

That makes it hard to talk about “Tren de Aragua” as a single organization with a strategy because there are at least four or five different levels or subgroups of the gang. They range from the gangs that work with Venezuelan government officials at gold mines in the country to the assassins who killed Ojeda in Chile to extortion gangs in Peru that have nothing to do with those first two groups and have never spoken to them to random 18 year old Venezuelan migrants falsely calling themselves TdA inside the US because they think it’s cool and gives them street cred. It’s as much a brand as it is a group, and with less of an ideology than other designated terrorist organizations.

Tulsi Gabbard fired the top two officials at the National Intelligence Council who were ultimately responsible for the report. They have also opened a leak investigation on the issue, having been embarrassed by media reporting about it. In an interview yesterday, Rubio said the NIC assessment was wrong and that he agrees with the FBI assessment.

There are a lot of moving parts to this controversy and it’s worth spreading them out:

• Does the Maduro regime tolerate and/or cooperate with TdA within Venezuelan territory?

• Does the Maduro regime direct TdA activities outside of Venezuela? (The Ojeda assassination in Chile being an example everyone is aware of).

• Does the Maduro regime direct TdA activities within the US?

• Was TdA sent to the US as part of a strategy by Maduro to destabilize the country?

• Is the Trump administration politicizing and undermining its own intelligence community by pushing them to give the answers they want?

Whatever you think of the other questions, the answer to that last question appears to be yes. It’s troubling because the US will lose skilled intelligence analysts if it insists on assessments that prioritize political goals. It’s also troubling because political pressure on intelligence assessments can lead to very bad policy outcomes. Political leaders aren’t required to agree with intelligence assessments, nor do they need to take the advice of analysts. However, they should never pressure analysts to alter evidence or produce analytical judgements to meet pre-determined and politically convenient conclusions. Firing professionals producing quality analysis will turn out poorly.

At least 17 family members of former Sinaloa Cartel leader El Chapo and his son Ovidio Guzmán Lopez entered the United States.