Region - Electoral uncertainty

The lack of clear frontrunners is both a symptom of some of the region’s political challenges as well as a cause of potential instability moving forward.

I don’t know who is going to win Chile’s presidential election. 

I also don’t know who is going to win Colombia’s presidential election.

When I say, “I don’t know,” that’s not me throwing my hands in the air and saying predictions are impossible. It’s absolutely possible to build formal models that assign probabilities to various candidates and scenarios. I’ve occasionally been known to do that professionally.

Nor is the point to say that all outcomes are equally likely. For example, Gustavo Petro is the clear frontrunner in Colombia with around a 35%-40% chance of winning. His odds of winning are much higher than any of his opponents’ but the combined odds of a “Not Petro” scenario are higher than the odds of Petro winning. 

Instead, my point is that in both elections no candidate is over 50% likely to win. Additionally, in both elections, the possibility of a current longshot - someone outside the top two spots - surging in the final weeks and winning is much higher than normal. 

The real world effects of this sort of political uncertainty go beyond bond trading and wagers on online betting markets (though those are fun too). While I don’t think Chile or Colombia will precisely follow the path of Peru’s election where the worst two candidates made the second round, Peru’s recent election offers some lessons as to what happens when there is no consensus on the frontrunners. 

First, the breakdown of political parties is both a cause of and an outcome to these sorts of elections without consolidated frontrunners. The lack of a solid political party system allows many outsiders to compete and the overall distrust of major political parties means those outsiders get some benefit in years where an anti-establishment vote is strong. That appears to create a negative spiral for party systems (though I’d like to see more data on this). After turning towards outsiders, citizens generally don’t turn back to strong political parties when they see the failure of outsiders. Instead, they become more disillusioned with the system and search for new outsiders to do better.

Second, when done concurrent to congressional elections, presidential elections with high uncertainty lead to complicated executive-legislative relations. When Congress seats are assigned in a divided and inchoate first round and the president is elected in a runoff a month later, it makes it more difficult for that president to build a working Congressional majority. 

Third, if citizens keep changing their preferred frontrunners that means there is a bit of luck of the draw going into these elections. The candidate that grabs momentum and surges in the final weeks makes the second round. Maybe they are strategically brilliant and time their surge correctly, but it’s more likely they get some lucky break and the media attention at the right moment. That same candidate would have fallen to increased scrutiny and a new rising trend if the election were four weeks later. 

Picking a president based on which meme candidate is popular this week is unlikely to be the best way to create a sustainable coalition over four years of governing. When a longshot candidacy succeeds because of real grassroots momentum and coalition building, it’s a victory for democracy. When a longshot candidacy succeeds due to a brief surge at the right time followed by the fortune of facing a worse opponent in the runoff, it’s a big gamble for the country.