Pre-Thanksgiving Tuesday edition of Six Stories - 25 November 2025
Includes a link to register for a live webinar briefing next week.
Happy Thursday Tuesday. I use the Thursday newsletter to highlight stories that aren’t directly about the US, but given that I’ll be taking Thanksgiving off from writing, I’m publishing this week’s Six Stories today.
If you enjoy today’s newsletter and would like to receive this sort of Latin America coverage in your inbox every Thursday, please pay to subscribe. It’s $90 per year for individuals or $350 per year for institutional subscribers.
In today’s newsletter:
Bolsonaro detained
Honduras and China
Bolivia’s early split
Venezuela future scenarios
Mexico Protests (again)
Link to register for webinar next week
Feel free to respond to this email with feedback, comments, and questions.
Jair Bolsonaro tried to remove his ankle bracelet. Whether he did it due to a genuine escape attempt, a moment of mental breakdown, or simple boredom-induced curiosity, it violated the terms of his house arrest. Brazil’s former president was thrown in prison. Coincidentally (or not, for the conspiracy fans out there), Bolsonaro’s detention came a day after the US dropped the extra tariffs on Brazil.
Jair Bolsonaro won’t be a candidate in 2026. But how Bolsonaro and his family play the election matters greatly for who runs and whether Lula can get reelected. Brazil’s entire political system seems stuck on the question of whether the former president, who is banned from running and sitting in prison due to an alleged mental breakdown, decides to finally step aside. Brazil’s opposition cannot coalesce until Bolsonaro either blesses a successor or is forcibly sidelined.
If Bolsonaro and his family do step back from the limelight, the top contender is São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas. Thomas Traumann has a smart profile of the governor and his attempts to use a security populist agenda (see my column in WPR last week) to improve his national standing.
Yet, as Valor writes this week, Tarcísio continues to position himself as running for reelection for governor. He seems overly cautious, refusing to make the national run unless he is guaranteed a clear path to be the opposition’s only major candidate and has a good shot at winning. He has no interest in resigning as governor before April of next year to make a long-shot bid in a multi-candidate field. His job is relatively secure at the state level, and gubernatorial reelection would be a much easier path.
A few readers have asked me to clarify this comment from a newsletter last week: “I’ve never seen China as involved in a Latin American election as they are in Honduras.”
Early Harvest trade perks - Beijing fast-tracked tariff-free access for shrimp, coffee, and melons.
Rushed shrimp rescue - Beijing signed over US$50 million in shrimp purchase contracts over the past two years.
Accelerated FTA negotiations - China pushed to publicize that 22 of 23 FTA chapters were ready, framing a near-complete deal as a reward voters would lose if a pro-Taiwan candidate wins.
Energy investments - China is involved in two hydroelectric projects and has signed a letter promising future investment, obviously contingent on the country not flipping back to Taiwan.
High-profile congressional trip to China - A PRC-sponsored delegation traveled to China in September. Liberal Party lawmakers refused to go.
Chinese embassy donations - After the delegation, the PRC embassy donated computer equipment to the Honduran Congress.
Education diplomacy - China opened a Confucius Institute and announced new scholarship programs in mid-2025.
Additional paid visits - Sources in the region have told me that Beijing sponsored Honduran NGOs and journalists to travel to China for visits that are less publicized. Many of the people given those trips are close to the Libre government.
China wants to make sure that the country is aware of the benefits that will be lost if Nasralla or Asfura win and flip recognition back to Taipei. Many of the items above including the shrimp purchases and scholarships, are intended to push back against the exact things that the country lost when it cut off its relations with Taiwan in 2023.
Also see AQ, NDI, and Atlantic Council on the election conditions.
Casey Cagley analyzes the split between President Rodrigo Paz and Vice President Edman Lara that is already destabilizing the new Bolivian administration after just a few weeks in office.
Lara expressed open frustration at the inclusion of Samuel Doria Medina allies such as his Vice Presidential Candidate José Luis Lupo in Paz’s cabinet. Lara has since alleged that Doria Medina governs “from the shadows.” Lara viewed these appointments as a betrayal, a recycling of the “old caste” that he campaigned against. He wanted his quota; he wanted “Laristas” in key positions.
The post continues to describe how Lara plans to run a Larista list in the local elections scheduled for March 2026. The vice president also claims he commands the loyalty of more than two dozen members of Congress, enough that he could split the government’s ruling coalition and prevent the legislature from passing the reforms the government needs.
Paz could not have won the presidency without Lara, whose populist anti-corruption message allowed the ticket to make gains among former MAS voters who were disillusioned with the party of Evo but were also not ready to turn to the older generation of rightist politicians. Now he must govern with Lara, whose authoritarian streak and ambition for power seems ready to disrupt what should be a longer and happier honeymoon for the new government.
JP Spinetto writes about what it will take to fix Venezuela’s economy post-Maduro, focusing on five areas: measuring economic statistics correctly, restarting the oil industry, building an economy outside of oil, restoring access to international credit, and restructuring the $160 billion in debt.
That’s a useful list if Maduro suddenly decides to retire tomorrow and hand power over to Edmundo Gonzalez and Maria Corina Machado. But it’s also a useful list under nearly all circumstances. It’s what Venezuela needs to do if Maduro cuts a deal that allows him to stick around. They are the reforms the country needs if Delcy or Diosdado weasel their way into the presidency. It’s what happens if there is a military coup and some junior officer takes over. Those are the reforms if the US or China conducts a military invasion and takeover of the country and installs their own preferred government. It’s the economic reforms that will be needed if zombie Hugo Chavez rises from the grave to rule in a dystopian horror nightmare. It’s the reform agenda that the country will need if there are successive annual coups flipping among all those scenarios for the next decade (ok, maybe not the zombie apocalypse one).
Yet, even though this seems to be the path that should be taken under nearly every scenario moving forward, it’s not guaranteed to happen under any of the scenarios. If you want proof of that, look at the Bolivia story above this one. Transitions are hard and involve messy politics. Bolivia has a bunch of economic reforms that are required to succeed, and may see them derailed by the Paz vs Lara fight. Whether Venezuela reaches an instant Machado-led regime change or a slow Delcy-managed transition, the success of a reform agenda that everyone promises as the next step is far from guaranteed.
My WPR column this week is on Mexico’s protests. It goes beyond last week’s newsletter to discuss how the potential recall referendum Sheinbaum faces in 2027 will shape her political strategy and the challenges in 2026.
Over on his Substack, Alex González Ormerod writes about a separate protest movement that has emerged in recent days.
Truck drivers have legitimate fears about driving on Mexican roads as highway robbery has boomed. The cargo and vehicle are often held for ransom.
The farmers are angry about a recent Water Reform through which the government seeks to retake control of Mexico’s water sources….
…At the heart of the matter, though, is the low price of maize.
As with the Gen-Z protests earlier this month,
Sheinbaum has worked harder to discredit the new protest movement blocking highways as inauthentic and funded by her oligarchic political opponents, rather than address the legitimate concerns that have caused so many people to protest.
This new movement is no more likely to spike into a giant, destabilizing national movement than the Gen-Z protests. But the existence of these medium-sized temporary protests signals a different challenge for the Sheinbaum government. It’s also a signal that perhaps there is discontent hiding beneath her positive approval rating.
A government facing multiple protests, an internal party split, and the potential for difficult trade negotiations in the coming year is in a poor position to withstand a recall referendum, even with a 70% approval rating.
Next Thursday, at 11AM EST I will host a live event on Zoom. I’ll give a short presentation about political risk trends, probably get derailed by breaking news out of Venezuela or Honduras, and then take questions from the viewers. You can register for the event here:
https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_BhBmyg-pQ9OsG8nM0SUV2w
Feel free to send questions in advance as well. I’ll try to record the event for those who can’t make it. No guarantees the technology will work.
I’m really thankful for the opportunity to write this newsletter for all of you. I’m not doing any Black Friday deals, but I am promising to increase the work I put into this newsletter next year to make it even more valuable for paying subscribers. My goal in 2026 is to make this newsletter the main focus of my business. That requires earning your trust and gaining more subscribers. Thanks to everyone who reads and who has paid to support this newsletter.