Mexico Security Notes - November 2024

Does Sheinbaum have an unannounced "bullets, not hugs" military strategy? Also, I made a map for you to tear apart and disagree with.

Observations about Mexico's security situation from around the 40 day point of President Claudia Sheinbaum's term:

1) In the first week of her administration, the president announced she wants a data-driven approach with better policing and social spending to go after the root causes. She also promised to target improvements in security in the ten most violent municipalities (an approach I absolutely agree with).

Sheinbaum is avoiding the 'hugs not bullets rhetoric' without explicitly saying she is rejecting AMLO's formulation. She has openly rejected comparisons of her approach to Calderon's war on cartels or EPN's kingpin strategy.

2) Without a major public announcement, the Sheinbaum government has implemented a more aggressive posture by Mexico's military and national guard, leading to more gunfights between the government and criminals, more drug seizures and more collateral casualties. The military isn't directly taking the fight at the cartel leadership and trying to dismantle the groups. They are engaging in battles in public locations to demonstrate that the state, not the criminal groups, controls the territory. At least that's how I read the unannounced portion of the strategy.

3) In his opening months in office, AMLO militarized in the sense that he relied on the military (and later the National Guard) to a far greater degree than expected and gave them a greater economic and infrastructure role in the country. Simultaneously, Lopez Obrador often ordered his military to avoid confrontations with certain criminal groups, something that narrowly reduced homicides in some parts of the country but did not improve the overall security situation.

Sheinbaum seems to have pivoted AMLO's militarization to actual military operations but without a big announcement about the strategy change. More bullets; fewer hugs. If that is accurate, then homicides will increase at least temporarily due to the government vs cartel clashes. The question becomes whether the government can win and establish order in locations, something that would decrease violence, or if the cartels effectively fight back, which would stabilize the elevated levels of violence.

4) The cartels are reacting to greater government operations with their own violent actions, assassinating mayors, military officers, and civil society leaders and committing public massacres. They also continue to attack each other. The initial data aren't clear as to whether homicides are increasing, decreasing or moving to new locations, but the vibe (the critical variable all analysts must care about in 2024) is that there is more violence in recent weeks and the military is involved in more combat events than they were six months ago.

5) Where are things worse?

• There is a central corridor of violence accompanied by extortion and cargo theft. Queretaro and EdoMex seem particularly bad over the past month.

• There is a wave of violence along the Pacific Coast, including Guerrero, Colima and Michoacan, but these states have long had serious issues. I'm hesitant to say things have gotten worse here without clear data, but it does appear the Sheinbaum government is pushing back harder than AMLO did in these states.

• There are increases of violence in Tabasco and Chiapas that started in the final year of AMLO's presidency. Those states are catching up to Veracruz and Quintana Roo in terms of being a hotspot battled over by cartels.

5b) The Northeast has notably not heated up. Nuevo Leon has seen violence throughout this year, but reports from there, Tamaulipas and Coahuila all suggest things plodding along as they were a few months ago.

6) Some of this is complicated by the ongoing internal battles within the Sinaloa Cartel, which is having a leadership dispute that is increasing violence in territories (the state of Sinaloa being critical) that were previously safer than average due to a lack of conflict among the criminal groups. This increase is separate from any strategy announced or unannounced by Sheinbaum, but it is up to her government to address it.

7) The reports about violence suggest a greater number of non-Mexicans are working for the cartels. Incidents involving Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Venezuelans seem to have increased. I doubt this is just a one month trend, but it's one I noticed while reading through recent news items.

8) If it is correct that there is an unannounced military offensive going on, what else isn't Sheinbaum announcing? Could there be negotiations with criminal groups? Could there be coordination and foreign support in targeting the cartels? That second point on foreign cooperation is something AMLO opposes, and therefore Sheinbaum should avoid announcing.

9) Long, long ago, I wrote about how Felipe Calderon was influenced by Alvaro Uribe. Mexico's president looked at Colombia and saw a leader who was wildly popular because he successfully took on the country's security challenge. In that same style, I wonder what influence the Bukele narrative is having on Sheinbaum and her decision-making about security. I'm sure the public answer is "El Salvador is smaller than most Mexican states and has no influence here." But it is the regional narrative getting attention right now.

10) I made a map. I made it because people like maps and it is a nice way to visualize the problem. The states are labeled based on my gut take at the moment and not based on any specific methodology. Please don't email me from official business/government accounts demanding I provide the data to prove this is accurate (it happens more often than you think). I point to the disclaimer. Arguing as to why this is wrong is part of the point.