Guatemala State of Emergency - January 2026
The gangs caused Arevalo to start a state of emergency. Politics may push him to continue it.
Guatemalan President Bernardo Arevalo declared a 30 day state of emergency to combat gang violence in the country. The measure suspends certain civil liberties including the right to protest and allows authorities to detain and hold suspects without a court order.
The announcement was provoked by a series of prison riots at three different locations that took 46 people hostage. After the government regained control of the prisons, the gangs - Barrio 18 and MS-13 - engaged in retaliatory attacks around the capital, killing ten police officers. That led to the presidential announcement.
The state of emergency feels like a serious shift in tone for the notoriously moderate and cautious Arevalo government. It represents a significant departure from his original platform and reflects the political pressure he faces both domestically and from the Trump administration. The head of the Semilla bloc in Congress is calling the gangs “terrorists.” Local politicians are highlighting how the violence fits into the regional cartel fight, including the influence of Mexican criminal groups. This rhetoric is more along the lines of Trump’s and Bukele’s language than Arevalo’s.
AP places the Guatemalan state of emergency in a regional context, framing it as part of “progressive” governments in Latin America that are being politically forced to back mano dura laws due to Bukele’s popular influence and pressure from Trump’s policies. Nayib Bukele in El Salvador and Xiomara Castro in Honduras have both declared states of emergency that have been repeatedly extended, allowing them to stretch and break the constitutional limits on their powers in office. I expect Nasry Asfura to maintain or expand the Honduran state of emergency upon taking office.
Three scenarios moving forward in Guatemala:
30 days and done - The state of emergency expires after a month, and Arevalo returns to his previous cautious and institutional approach on security.
Extension creep - Arevalo follows the pattern of Bukele, Castro, and Noboa in Ecuador and continuously extends the state of emergency all year.
Escalation - Arevalo expands his authorities, cracks down on gang influence in prisons, and engages in a militaristic offensive against the gangs on the streets.
The reaction from the gangs is one key variable. If they escalate the violence in the country, then the Guatemalan government will maintain or escalate its response.
If the gangs don’t escalate, everything we know about Arevalo suggests that scenario A is most likely. He’s an institutional and democratic leader who has avoided expanding the power of the executive. Yet, beyond the recent shift in tone, there are other elements of Guatemalan politics that play toward this, moving toward one of the other scenarios.
The state of emergency passed the Congress by a near unanimous vote. Arevalo has struggled to get his agenda through Congress, yet this security emergency suddenly gives him support across the political spectrum.
The Barrio 18 gang leader captured during the prison raid (Aldo Duppie) is married to the niece of Sandra Torres, Arevalo’s opponent in the 2023 election runoff.
There aren’t many high-quality polls in Guatemala, but the general consensus is that prior to this event, Arevalo’s approval rating was likely in the mid-30s. While the president won initial support by representing a different and less corrupt style of politics, the population had soured on the president due to his lack of action and the lack of change in the country. Now there is a rally-around-the-flag moment in which Arevalo can use a populist security policy to regain lost support.
Arevalo will face a major political fight later this year when Attorney General Consuelo Porras’s term in office finally ends in May 2026. She has been a thorn in the president's side, trying to remove him from office, and she hopes to finish the job before her term ends and/or extend her influence beyond the current term by forcing the selection of an ally of hers. This state of emergency and the political momentum that comes with it will help Arevalo defeat Porras in the political battle both domestically in the Congress and with the Trump administration, where she has some support.
Fighting the gangs meets the vibe of the moment both domestically and regionally. It’s the sort of thing governments are doing. And while Arevalo has generally been seen as an exception in the region, he’s shown himself willing to cooperate with the Trump administration on counter-narcotics and migration, in ways that may signal he is moving toward more typical regional policies. For example, Arevalo has indicated he wants the FBI’s help in fighting the gangs.
All the reasons above lead to a final reason for the extension. They point to reasons why Scenario A is a dangerous political place for Arevalo to end up. If Guatemala’s president backs down after 30 days, even if that is the correct move, his political opponents will use what they perceive as his lack of initiative against him.
The state of emergency was set off by a battle between the government and the gangs. But it’s also a battle over Arevalo’s stability in office, his relationship with the US, and his ability to advance his agenda. Any analysis of how Arevalo uses these powers and whether they continue beyond one month requires the political angle.
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