El Salvador - Constitutional reform

President Bukele’s proposal to reform the country’s constitution is an attempt to consolidate power and defeat his critics.

Most constitutional rewrites in Latin America are driven by power-hungry executives claiming to represent the will of the people. Two constitutional rewrite processes are in their early stages in Latin America that appear to follow that model.* One is in Peru, where President Castillo and his more extreme allies appear to be pushing for a constitutional reform process to go forward early, even as the moderates within his team are focused on getting a majority in Congress to pass an agenda. More on the Peru issue in a future newsletter.

The other constitutional rewrite has been a surprise reform issued by Nayib Bukele in El Salvador in recent weeks. Tim Muth has a useful review of the specifics of the reforms as well as the opposition from civil society. Go read both of those posts if you want to get into the details. 

The quick summary is that Nayib Bukele’s government has presented a constitutional reform that appears on the surface to have a number of positive changes for the country including expanding human rights and prohibiting discrimination. The reform also drops term limits, allows for a public referendum process, and changes out the Supreme Court and Electoral Institutions. 

In practice, these changes will almost certainly help the president consolidate control of the country, limit checks against his power, and hold on to office beyond his original term. The fact that the text of the reform comes directly from the executive branch and has not had input by civil society and other stakeholders is troubling.

Bukele remains popular in the country (his approval rating is likely around 65-70%), he has a rubber stamp legislature, and a large portion of the public is likely to support any reform that his government puts forward. Bukele is arguing that he cannot effectively govern without this reform and will make the case (as do so many other presidents) that he needs more time in office because the first years of his first term don’t really count due to operating under an old constitution.

Meanwhile, El Faro published an investigation this week that highlights new evidence that Bukele secretly (and likely illegally) negotiated a truce with gang leaders in order to improve the country’s security situation and then covered up the evidence. Bukele’s removal of the Attorney General and weakening of anti-corruption investigations may be related to his desire to avoid investigations and prosecutions into this issue. It’s also another sign that people should be skeptical of any constitutional reform proposed by the administration. 

The New York Times covers the Biden administration’s challenge in Central America balancing anti-corruption concerns with migration. My comments last week make clear which side I come down on that issue. The problem is not just El Salvador, with Guatemala undermining anti-corruption efforts, Honduras holding an election under questionable conditions and Nicaragua increasing repression of all opponents. 

Bukele’s challenge, however, remains unique in that he is popular while the others are not. Civil society efforts fighting to expose Bukele’s corruption and push back against his efforts to undermine democracy face the obvious critique that the public wants Bukele to succeed. In that way, his constitutional reform effort looks similar to Chavez in Venezuela or Fujimori in Peru, rewrites that were wildly popular at the time but that ultimately led the country down a wrong path.

*One way in which Chile’s constitutional rewrite is quite different from most in Latin America is that it has been driven by citizen demands, even as a large portion of the political class has opposed and fought against the process.