Lula won by just over two million votes, 51-49 percent. There were also nearly 6 million null and blank votes cast.
The current conventional wisdom on Lula is that his next term won’t be as economically prosperous or politically successful as his previous terms. Global economic headwinds combined with a strong Bolsonarista opposition in the Congress and in state and local governments will make it much harder for him to govern. On economics, he’ll play both sides, leaning towards centrist advisors and an orthodox economic policy while also expanding social spending. It will be a balance that in theory makes the business community and his base generally happy. But he won't get the same benefits of growth that he did in the past.
Still, Latin American politics is sometimes about surprising outcomes, so it’s worth considering the best case and worst case outcomes for Lula. Neither of these scenarios is likely, but they give a sense of the range of potential paths forward.
Best case: Lula prospers. Freed of the whims and poor governance of Bolsonaro, combined with a lucky surge in commodity prices, Brazil’s economy returns to surprisingly high levels of growth. In spite of the problems that everyone sees - inflation remains stubbornly high and the country’s debts will eventually need to be paid - new foreign money pours into Brazil, allowing Lula to push those problems further into the future. Lula negotiates with and buys off his political opponents, allowing him to pass an ambitious agenda that keeps his popularity high for the next four years. In the process, Bolsonaro fades from view, a fringe politician with limited support who is pushed aside by legal challenges and his former allies.
Worst case: Lula disgraced. The economy enters a deep and long recession due to a combination of global challenges and self-inflicted mistakes. Bolsonaro and his allies create political stagnation so nothing can pass, and the secret budget means that Lula has no leverage in Congress for negotiating. Ongoing conflicts with pro-Bolsonaro security forces create headaches for Lula, and pro-Bolsonaro actors continue to commit random acts of violence against Lula supporters and the left. President Lula loses his political discipline, flails politically trying to solve the problems, and ends up with new corruption scandals that lead to impeachment.
The big current question, one that plays a role in whether Lula’s term ends up near the best or worst case outcomes or closer to the conventional wisdom, is how Bolsonaro reacts to the election loss.
As of the publication of this newsletter, Bolsonaro has been silent since the results were announced. He’s held a meeting with close advisors in the presidential palace, and since left the palace with no announcements. His wife, Michelle, has reportedly unfollowed both him and his son Carlos, who have in turn followed suit.
Even after he speaks, Bolsonaro isn’t going to provide clear direction about the transition. He will protest, hedge, rally supporters, and otherwise try to thread the needle of attempting to overturn the election without ending up in prison in the attempt. He won’t succeed in remaining president, but the rocky transition will make Lula’s ability to start governing more difficult.
Additional notes
That two point margin matches the polling aggregator we wrote about in Wednesday’s newsletter. The polling aggregation for this election was very accurate at a national level, even if individual pollsters missed the mark.
The president-elect’s victory speech was one in which he attempted to demonstrate a level of reconciliation, and it’s worth reading in full. He wants to govern Brazil well and unite the country. He is hoping for a productive and smooth transition of power.
Today’s column in World Politics Review addresses Lula’s foreign policy.
We are hosting a Twitter Space with Catherine Osborn, the author of Foreign Policy’s Latin America Brief, this Thursday, November 3, at 11am EDT to discuss the results of the second round of Brazil’s presidential election. This event is open to the public, and you can access it from here. We hope you will join us!
Tomorrow’s newsletter will address…. the regional map. If you’re on Twitter, you know which one I’m talking about.