A framework for how Latin American leaders respond
Though it's the wrong strategy for most leaders today, I can think of one former Latin American leader who would have embraced arguing with Trump on social media
My first drafts are often quite different from my final drafts. The unpublished first draft of my WPR column this week opened with this paragraph:
As US President Donald Trump threatens sanctions, tariffs, and military conquest, it seems logical to believe that Latin America and the Caribbean should unite to counter those threats. A coordinated diplomatic effort would be more effective than every country negotiating alone. However, the region won’t do that. As to the reason why, we can blame Hugo Chavez.
I ended up taking the column in a different direction, leading with the impact and chaos of the week rather than Latin America’s response. Some of the sentences from that above paragraph made their way into the closing paragraphs. I cut the “blame Hugo Chavez” line despite the feeling that it was a great hook to draw the reader in. Pulling it off requires a logical twist too far to pin today’s regional integration problems on the Venezuelan leader who died in 2013.
Still, the history of the 2000s, the collapse of Venezuela, and the failures of the Pink Tide era contribute to why Latin America cannot coordinate a response. The OAS remains dominated by US influence, making it difficult today to get items on the larger agenda that don’t align with the White House. Alternative regional organizations created back when Hugo Chavez was alive, including CELAC, UNASUR, and ALBA, were never successfully institutionalized into real diplomatic forces, instead relying on the personal leadership and friendships of specific leaders. Trade alliances including Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance have cracked amid political differences. The economic crash and descent into dictatorship of Venezuela served to undermine an entire generation of leftists who supported regional integration and an alternative to US dominance (for this, you can blame Chavez!). It’s difficult to build a regional response on the fly from a position of weakness while Latin America arguably dropped the ball on that process during its moment of strength of the commodity boom two decades ago.
That failure of regional integration meant that when Honduran President Xiomara Castro called for a regional meeting under CELAC to respond to Trump’s threats of sanctions against Colombia, nobody showed up. As Petro floundered, Mulino faced down a threat on the canal, and Sheinbaum dealt with tariffs, their neighbors barely budged. When Trump sent someone to shake hands and negotiate with Maduro, not a single regional leader spoke up publicly to criticize the policy shift. Everyone is on their own and few want their country to capture Trump’s attention and draw his fire.
To the extent anyone wants Trump’s attention, it’s to cut deals and gain influence. That is why Bukele tweeted in agreement with shutting down USAID, and Ecuador preemptively launched tariffs against Mexico.
As each leader responds alone, it’s useful for analysts to consider their options and their personalities. I built the chart below as a first draft of attempting to do so.
A few notes:
Argue away. I’m defining these categories in terms of how leaders are responding to Trump, not how they are governing in general. Also, I’m certain there will be plenty of disagreements over where I place these leaders. Please let me know why you think I’m wrong. This is less about me being correct about categorizing the specific leaders two weeks into Trump’s term and more about working towards a framework to analyze regional responses that can be used moving forward.
I struggled with figuring out the best terms for technocratic and populist. I think I’d still prefer different words. I started with professional and amateurish, but it’s not fair to call someone like Bukele an “amateur” when he is quite savvy in how he is dealing with this situation. Yet, the words I chose also don’t quite capture what I’m looking for.
Don’t be in the bottom right corner! I think the other five positions can potentially handle Trump, but the bottom right corner is where Trump thrives. Leaders who slip into angry populist mode in combatting Trump will find themselves at a disadvantage.
Finally, none of these responses are set in stone. I would have thought Mulino would be in the top left, not the top right, until the Panama Canal controversy. Just because Petro began on the wrong foot doesn’t mean he’s doomed to remain in that spot. Leaders can both choose to move and be forced into different positions by a Trump administration that is still just getting started.